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Our nation's libraries house thousands of volumes chroni-
cling the effects of inexpensive microcomputers on our work-
places, schools, and daily lives. Sociologists debate the merits of
this technological innovation,' while economists hail the rise of
software and semiconductor manufacturing as a source of clean
jobs.2 The law has struggled to keep pace with these rapid de-
velopments.3 Scholarly literature on the law and its relation-
ship to emerging technology reflects a tension between the
incorporation of technological developments into existing con-
structs, and the creation of new bodies of law to account for the
computer industry's special needs.4
With the overwhelming success of entrepreneurial computer
pioneers such as Apple co-founder Steve Wozniak, computer
engineers are viewed as unusually creative and admirable souls
* Member, Third Year Class. The author wishes to dedicate this note to the
memory of her grandfather, James C. McBaine.
1. C. EVANS, THE MIGHTY MICRO: THE IMPACT OF THE MICRO-CHIP REVOLUTION
passim (1979).
2. United States computer companies grossed $14.9 billion in software sales in
1982, and total sales will probably reach $39.1 billion in 1986. U.S. DEPT. OF COM-
MERCE, HIGH TECHNOLOGY INDUSTRIES: PROFILES AND OUTLOOKS IN THE COMPUTER
INDUSTRY 15 (1983).
3. "Congress, as well as the judiciary, is hard pressed to keep current on com-
puter developments." Note, Copyright Infringement of Computer Programs: A Modi-
fication of the Substantial Similarity Test, 68 MINN. L. REV. 1264, 1269 n.34 (1984).
4. See, e.g., Note, The Medium is the Message, Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin
Computer Corp., 18 U.S.F. L. REV. 351 (1984); cf. Note, Protection of Proprietary
Rights in Computer Programs: A "Basic" Formula for Debugging the System, 57 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 92 (1982) (wherein the author urges legislation specifically directed at
protecting computer programs).
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whose proprietary interests deserve special protection.5 Intel-
lectual property concepts protect proprietary interests through
several avenues, including patent, trade secret, and contract
law. However, Congress has focused its efforts on incorporat-
ing software technology into existing copyright theories.
In 1976, Congress overhauled the Copyright Act to emphasize
that copyright subsists in "original works of authorship fixed in
any tangible medium of expression, now known or later devel-
oped from which they can be perceived ... either directly or
with the aid of a machine or device. ' '6 While the 1976 Act was
pending, Congress created CONTU, the Commission on New
Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works,7 to further study
copyright problems raised by computer development. CONTU
subsequently proposed that the Act "should be amended... to
make it explicit that computer programs, to the extent they
embody an author's original creation, are proper subject matter
of copyright."8 The Commission suggested that the Act should
include a definition of computer program, and authorize the
making of a backup copy of each piece of copyrighted software.'
Congress adopted CONTU's suggestions verbatim in 1980.10
Courts have continued the process of incorporating consider-
ations unique to computer technology into existing modes of
copyright protection in interpreting the amended Copyright
Act. Until recently, uncertainty remained as to whether pro-
grams expressed in object code 1 (such as microcomputer sys-
tems software) fell within the ambit of copyright protection. In
Apple Computer Co. v. Franklin Computer, Inc.,12 the Court of
5. For an intriguing look at the people behind computer design, see T. KIDDER,
THE SOUL OF A NEW MACHINE (1981).
6. Copyright Revision Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (codi-
fied at 17 U.S.C. § 101-810 (1982)).
7. Act of Dec. 31, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-573, § 201-08, 88 Stat. 1873.
8. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED
WORKS, FINAL REPORT 2 (1978) [hereinafter CONTU Report].
9. Id. at 30.
10. Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 10, 94 Stat. 3015, 3028-29 (1980) (codi-
fied at 17 U.S.C. § 101-17 (1982)).
11. Object code is distinguished from source code. Source code describes the level
of language in which a programmer inputs, reads, and edits program instructions.
Source code is easily comprehensible to appropriately trained persons, such as pro-
grammers. Object code, on the other hand, describes the coding of a sequence of elec-
tronic signals (instructions), which interact with the computer's circuitry to produce a
desired result. See Conley & Bryan, A Unifying Theory for the Litigation of Com-
puter Software Copyright Cases, 63 N.C.L. REv. 563, 565-67 (1985).
12. 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed, 465 U.S. 1033 (1984).
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Appeals for the Third Circuit held that these programs are in-
cluded within the scope of protected literary works.'3
After the Third Circuit's 1983 decision in Apple, some com-
mentators declared the software copyright issue resolved.
14
However, the copyright approach, which seemed like a godsend
when applied to a case of undisputed copying in Apple, has seri-
ous drawbacks for other cases because courts lack a workable
standard for determining when infringement of copyrighted
material in computer programs has occurred.15
This note examines these drawbacks, which result in part
from lack of judicial understanding of computer technology. 6
It focuses on one trial court's approach to a complex set of facts
involving disputed, non-verbatim copying in SAS Institute, Inc.
v. S&H Computer Systems.17 Section II outlines the basic tech-
nical distinctions essential to understanding the issues dis-
cussed in this note. Section III provides a comparative analysis
of the Apple and SAS Institute cases. Section IV addresses the
difficulties inherent in comparing object code works and dis-
cusses problems with the SAS Institute approach. In section V,
the author argues that the SAS Institute approach used for de-
termining copyright infringement is misguided, and concludes




The essence of the machine called a computer is a set of min-
ute and extremely complex circuits called the Central Process-
ing Unit (CPU).'" The CPU performs only the work computer
programs, or software, 9 instruct it to do.2" While a program
may be expressed to humans in written terms, to the CPU it is
but a series of magnetic charges which react with the com-
13. Id. at 1249.
14. See, e.g., supra note 4.
15. Note, supra note 3, at 1264.
16. Id. at 1266.
17. 605 F. Supp. 816 (M.D. Tenn. 1985).
18. Apple, 714 F.2d at 1243.
19. Programs, or "software," are distinguished from the machine parts and cir-
cuitry of the computer itself, or "hardware."
20. Apple, 714 F.2d at 1243.
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puter's circuitry in a designated sequence to produce a desired
result called output.
In designing software, the programmer is confronted with a
problem-solving challenge: he must get a machine to perform a
certain task through a complex series of logical steps. The de-
signer may draw flow charts, perform computations, or make
notes to facilitate the programming process.2' This material is
called documentation.
A computer program may be written in any of three levels of
language. 22 Most programmers begin with a high-level23 lan-
guage such as BASIC or FORTRAN because these languages
employ simple English-like statements,24 and combine several
CPU steps into one programming step.25 Alternatively, the
programmer may use an intermediate-level language called as-
sembly which uses alphanumeric labels. 26  Either of these
levels may be referred to as source code. Source code may be
loaded into a computer and textually edited, much as docu-
ments are treated in word processing.27 Source code is distin-
guished from object code, the lowest level computer language,
also called machine code.28 While source code is easily compre-
hensible to appropriately trained human beings,29 object code is
expressed in binary language, 30 a series of O's and l's to indicate
open or closed switches.31 Object code is comprehensible only
to skilled programmers assisted by computers and appropriate
software. The CPU can only follow instructions expressed in
object code.32 Programs are usually written in source code by a
separate program called a compiler.33
Computer programs are of two general types. Operating sys-
tem programs, expressed in object code, manage internal com-
21. See Conley & Bryan, supra note 11, at 564-65.
22. Apple, 714 F.2d at 1243.
23. These languages are so called both because they are similar to English lexicon,
and because they are farthest ("highest") from the level used by the computer. Id.
24. Id.
25. For example, the BASIC statement "Print," which directs the computer to
display a series of characters, requires the use of several steps at the object code level.
26. Apple, 714 F.2d at 1243. Assembly language enables the programmer to write
machine-level code using convenient mnemonic instruction.
27. SAS Institute, 605 F. Supp. at 818.








puter functions and facilitate the use of applications
programs.3 4 Systems software is often embedded on semi-con-
ductor chips called ROMs and directly installed into the com-
puter's circuitry. 5 Applications programs perform specific
tasks for the user; they are what make computers useful for
balancing checkbooks or playing games.3 6 Applications pro-
grams are generally distributed in their object code version
stored on a magnetic memory device such as a floppy disk.
Different brands or models of computers which employ
nearly identical CPUs, and which can therefore execute the
same object code programs interchangeably, are said to be com-
patible.37 With the exception of these compatibles, most com-
puter models utilize somewhat different processor circuitry.
Consequently, the sequence of magnetic signals (called the ob-
ject code) needed to perform a given task on the IBM PC, for
example, is completely different from the code required to exe-
cute the identical task on the Apple II. In order to use
software designed for the IBM on the Apple, a programmer
must "read" the IBM program (perhaps from a pre-compiler
source code listing) to identify its contents, make substantial
changes to compensate for circuitry differences between the




A. Apple Computer Co. v. Franklin Computer, Inc.
Shortly after Apple Computer Company began marketing its
popular Apple 1138 model home computer, Franklin Computer
Corporation, a comparatively small operation,39 introduced the
ACE 100. Franklin designed and advertised the ACE 100 as





38. As of 1983, Apple had sold over 400,000 Apple II Computers. Apple, 714 F.2d
at 1242.
39. At the time of the preliminary injunction hearing, Franklin employed only 75
people and had sold fewer than 1000 computers. Id. at 1245. Apple, in contrast, em-
ployed approximately 3000 with fiscal year 1981 sales of $335,000,000. Id. at 1244.
40. "Fully compatible" meant that the ACE 100 would run applications software
written for the Apple II, while substantially undercutting its price. Id. at 1243. In
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amined several programs41 sold with the ACE 100, and found
them nearly identical to programs marketed by Apple, with
only minor modifications apparently intended to disguise the
fact that Franklin's programs were copies.
42
Apple sought a preliminary injuction 43 restraining Franklin
from further distribution of the operating system software
44
with the ACE 100. Apple alleged that Franklin's programs
were duplicates of Apple's own system software, and that their
sale infringed Apple's copyright. Franklin admitted the copy-
ing,45 and focused its defense on legal issues such as the
copyrightability of the disputed programs.46 The district court
accepted Franklin's arguments and denied injunctive relief,
47
because it concluded, inter alia,48 that there was "some doubt
as to the copyrightability of the programs described in this
litigation.
49
On appeal, the Third Circuit reconsidered the three copy-
right challenges Franklin had presented in the lower court.50
Citing the Copyright Act's requirement that a work be fixed in
order for the ACE 100 to do this, the programs it used to regulate the functions of its
electronic parts-operating system software-had to be nearly identical to Apple's.
The technical reasons for this necessity are outlined in Apple. Id. at 1245.
41. Apple ultimately alleged infringement of 14 separate programs, some of which
were embedded on ROM chips, while others were recorded on magnetic disks. Id. at
1244 n.4.
42. Id. at 1245. "The variations that did exist were minor, consisting merely of
such things as deletion of reference to Apple or its copyright notice." Id.
43. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 545 F. Supp. 812 (E.D. Pa.
1982).
44. "Computer programs can be categorized by function as either application pro-
grams or operating system programs. Application programs usually perform a spe-
cific task for the computer user, such as word processing, checkbook balancing, or
playing a game. In contrast, operating system programs generally manage the inter-
nal functions of the computer or facilitate use of application programs." Apple, 714
F.2d at 1243.
45. Id. at 1245. As its sole factual defense, Franklin argued that directly copying
Apple's own operating system programs was the only method of ensuring the ACE
100's full compatibility with the Apple II, and that it would have been cost-prohibitive
for Franklin to write its own programs. Id. The court rejected this theory as an ex-
cuse for infringement. Id. at 1253.
46. Id. at 1245.
47. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 545 F. Supp. 812 (E.D. Pa.
1982).
48. The district court also held that Apple had failed to show that irreparable
harm would result if injunctive relief were not granted. Id. See also id. at 825.
49. Id. at 812.
50. "We read the district court opinion as presenting the following legal issues:
(1) whether copyright can exist in a computer program expressed in object code, (2)
whether copyright can exist in a computer program embedded on a ROM, [and] (3)
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some "tangible medium of expression,"51 the court reaffirmed
its holding in Williams Electronics, Inc. v. Artic International,
Inc.,52 which extended copyright protection to programs em-
bedded on ROM chips.53 It went on to consider as a matter of
first impression Franklin's contention that operating system
programs could not be the proper subject of copyright.5 4 The
court rejected this argument 5 as inconsistent with Congres-
sional intent in drafting the 1976 Copyright Act.56
Together with an analysis of the 1976 and 1980 amendments
to the Copyright Act and its decision in Williams Electronics,
the court addressed the copyrightability of object code pro-
grams.57 Copyright protection, it noted, subsists only in original
works of authorship.58 A work of authorship must be either a
literary work, or a member of one of six other statutory catego-
ries. 59 The court held that because the statutory definition of
literary works includes works expressed in "words, numbers,
or other verbal numerical symbols or indicia, ' '60 object code
programs6' are literary works.62 Since the amended Copyright
Act protects works which can be perceived either directly or
with the aid of a machine or device,63 the fact that object code
can be deciphered only by experienced programmers aided by
computers64 is no bar to its copyrightability.6 5 Furthermore,
whether copyright can exist in an operating system program .... Apple, 714 F.2d at
1246.
51. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982).
52. 685 F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1982).
53. Apple, 714 F.2d at 1249 (citing Williams, 685 F.2d at 874, 876).
54. Apple, 714 F.2d at 1249, 1250.
55. Id at 1253, 1254.
56. "Programs should no more be considered machine parts than videotapes
should be considered parts of projectors or phonorecords parts of sound reproduction
equipment." Id. at 1251 (citing CONTU Report, supra note 8, at 21).
The CONTU statement represents a good example of analogizing new technology to
the old in order to make it comprehensible to judges and legislators.
57. Id. at 1246-49.
58. Id. (citing 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982)).
59. Id. at 1249 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982)).
60. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
61. An object code program may be expressed in binary numerical form, or in a
mathematical notation called hexidecimal. Apple, 714 F.2d at 1243. For descriptions
of computer operations, see Note, Copyright Protection of Computer Program Object
Code, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1723 (1983).
62. Apple, 714 F.2d at 1249. The court cites the legislative history behind the 1976
Act, H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 54, as well as the CONTU Report (which
spurred the 1980 amendments), as supporting this proposition. Id.
63. 714 F.2d at 1247 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982)).
64. See supra notes 29-33 and accompanying text.
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since the Act as amended in 1980 defines a protected program
as a set of statements to be used either directly or indirectly to
bring about a desired result,66 the fact that object code pro-
grams such as those in Apple are used to control a machine's
basic functions does not exclude them from copyright
protection.67
The court therefore held that a computer program, whether
in object or source code, is a "literary work" and is protected
from unauthorized copying whether from its object or source
code version.6 Finding that the district court's decision to deny
Apple's motion for a preliminary injuction was influenced by
"an erroneous view of the availability of copyright for operating
system programs and unnecessary concerns about object code
and ROMs, ' 69 the court of appeals reversed and remanded the
case for reconsideration. °
The holding in Apple did not emerge from a legal, technologi-
cal, or economic vacuum.71 Many scholars have cited the inade-
quacy of other forms of intellectual property law to protect
entrepreneurial interests in the fast-paced and only recently
mass-marketed computer industry.72 Some commentators an-
ticipated the circumstances encountered by Apple and urged
65. Apple, 714 F.2d at 1248.
66. "We considered the issue of copyright protection for a computer program in
[Williams Electronics] and concluded that the copyrightability of computer programs
is firmly established after the 1980 amendment to the Copyright Act.'" Id. (quoting
Williams Electronics, 685 F.2d at 875).
67. Id. at 1248. "As source code instructions must be translated into object code
before the computer can act upon them, only instructions expressed in object code can
be used 'directly' by the computer." Id. Congress' inclusion of "directly" in the stat-
ute therefore suggests its intent to include object code programs.
68. Id. at 1249.
69. Id. at 1254.
70. Id.
71. The court of appeals received three amicus curiae briefs in support of Apple's
position, two from software manufacturers and one from a computer services trade
association. Id. at 1242 n.1.
72. One major drawback of reliance on patent protection of computer programs is
the inordinate length of time required to obtain a valid patent. See, e.g., Selinger,
Protecting Computer Software in the Business Environment: Patents, Copyrights
and Trade Secrets, 3 J.L. COM. 65, 74 (1983).
Moreover, trade secret protection, for example, is available only to actual secrets;
an item cannot be "self-disclosing" and widely available and still qualify for trade
secret protection. Since most computer programs "disclose" their contents to the eye
of the experienced programmer, mass-marketing hampers the effectiveness of relying
on trade secret law. See Gilburne & Johnston, Trade Secret Protection for Software
Generally and in the Mass Market, 3 COMPUTER L.J. 211, 227-37 (1982). The Copy-
right Act, when applicable, may preempt state trade secret law. See, e.g., Note, The
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Congress and the courts to afford ROM-based object code pro-
grams copyright protection.73 The ostensible impact of the Ap-
ple holding was welcomed as leading to greater protection for
computer works, thereby protecting programmers, fostering in-
novation, and furthering the aims of intellectual property law.74
However, the court devoted little attention to the ability of
courts to enforce Apple in practice.
Apple concerned the mechanical verbatim copying of Apple's
object code software by a competitor who marketed an Apple II
compatible-the Franklin ACE 100.11 SAS Institute, on the
other hand, involved allegations of infringement resulting from
S&H's attempts to adapt copyrighted IBM software to operate
on an incompatible computer, the VAX built by Digital Equip-
ment Company.76
Apple held that even a hard-to-decipher object code operat-
ing systems program is copyrightable. It left the trial court in
SAS Institute to resolve the practical question: how can a court
as fact finder determine whether copying has taken place in
the nearly incomprehensible realm of object code software?
77
B. SAS Institute, Inc. v. S&H Computer Systems
78
SAS Institute held that because the defendant used source
code and documentation provided with plaintiff's object code
program to develop its computer package, the defendant's pro-
gram constituted an unauthorized derivative work,79 and in-
fringed plaintiff SAS Institute's copyright over its object code
program."0
Copyrightability of Computer Software Containing Trade Secrets, 63 WASH. U.L.Q.
131, 150-52 (1985).
73. See Note, Copyright Protection of Computer Program Object Code, 96 HARV.
L. REV. 1723 (1983); Note, Copyright Protection for Computer Programs in Read Only
Memory Chips, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 329 (1982), cited in Apple, 714 F.2d at 1249.
74. See McCully, Computers and Copyright: Copyright Protection for Computer
Operating Systems Programs, 33 U. KAN. L. REV. 167 (1984).
75. Apple, 714 F.2d at 1244-45.
76. SAS Institute, 605 F. Supp. at 818.
77. For an insight into this realm, see Comment, Copyright Protection of Systems
Control Software Stored in Read Only Memory Chips: Into the World of Gulliver's
Travels, 33 BUFFALO L. REV. 193 (1984). One author actually predicted that courts
would next be faced with the problem of determining when copying had taken place
in cases alleging non-verbatim copying of object code programs. See McCully, supra
note 74, at 185.
78. 605 F. Supp. 816 (M.D. Tenn. 1985).
79. Id. at 831, 832.
80. Id. at 831-33.
19871
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SAS Institute copyrighted and widely marketed"' an inte-
grated statistics analysis program for use with IBM com-
puters.8 2 The Institute developed the program, known as the
Statistical Analysis System (SAS), 3 at substantial expense.84 It
did not sell copies of the program, but instead licensed its use
through individual contracts with customers.8 5
In 1981, a Vanderbilt University professor engaged in com-
plex biostatistics research investigated the possibility of licens-
ing SAS to perform sophisticated computations involved in his
work. 6 After learning that SAS was available only for IBM
and IBM-compatible computers, 7 the professor contacted two
faculty members and an employee of the university's comput-
ing center who was also employed by defendant S&H Com-
puter Systems. 8 The men considered designing an original,
state-of-the-art statistics package comparable to SAS to operate
on the university's VAX computers.8 9 After determining that
such a package would be difficult to market compared with a
package modeled after SAS,9° the group decided instead to de-
velop a VAX adaptation of SAS.91
Immediately thereafter, S&H obtained a license to use SAS 92
with the primary purpose, the Institute later contended, of "ob-
tain[ing] detailed technical information not otherwise avail-
able" for use in preparing its VAX version of SAS.93 S&H
received the SAS distribution package, which included a mag-
netic tape containing both the entire object code SAS program
and the source code for most of the program, including the crit-
81. Id. at 817.
82. Id. at 818. At trial, the Institute stated it was then testing a VAX version of
SAS. However, it had developed no such program when defendant's infringement
allegedly began.
83. Id. at 820.
84. The Institute first marketed the final release of SAS only after a development
process lasting five years and requiring over 18 man-years of labor. Id. at 818.





90. Id. at 819, 820.
91. Id. at 819. The group operated under the notion that the Institute had no
plans to develop a VAX version of SAS. They hoped that once their conversion was





ical portions which performed the various statistical analyses.94
The SAS licensing contract provided that S&H would use SAS
only on a specified computer, would not make any copies of
SAS, and would not modify SAS code beyond certain permissi-
ble, user-addressable sections. S&H programmers loaded the
source code into the VAX computer.95 They then used a text
editor96 to view and manipulate the code.97 S&H then devel-
oped a VAX-version object code program called INDAS to per-
form complex statistical analysis.
SAS Institute brought an action for injunctive relief against
S&H to prevent distribution of the VAX program claiming, in-
ter alia,9 copyright infringement and breach of contract relat-
ing to the SAS licensing agreement.99 After a hearing, the
court granted partial summary judgment upholding the Insti-
tute's copyright on SAS,100 but denied full summary judgment
on the copyright claim, citing genuine issues of material fact as
to the existence of copying.101 The court proceeded to try the
case without a jury,0 2 rendering a verdict for the plaintiff on
both the contract and infringement claims.
0 3
In upholding SAS Institute's copyright against legal chal-
lenge, the court cited Apple's statutory interpretation of the
Copyright Act.1 0 4 While Apple was not the first case to address
the object/source code distinction,0 5 Apple did reaffirm Wil-
liams Electronics. °6 The fact that Apple did not reach the
Supreme Court'07 may be a signal to trial courts that the Apple
court's interpretation of the Act will remain good law for quite
94. Id. at 821.
95. Id.
96. A text editor is a separate program which permits programmers to edit source
code by altering alphanumeric characters, much like a word processor.
97. SAS Institute, 605 F. Supp. at 822.
98. The Institute also claimed fraud, trade secret misappropriation, and unfair
competition. Id. at 816.
99. The license forbade S&H from copying the program or using it on any com-
puter other than the one specified in the contract; S&H did both of these things. Id. at
821.
100. S&H Computer Systems, Inc. v. SAS Institute, Inc., 568 F. Supp. 416, 424
(M.D. Tenn. 1983).
101. Id. at 424.
102. SAS Institute, 605 F. Supp. at 817.
103. Id. at 817, 818. Having granted relief, the court declined to address the Insti-
tute's fraud, unfair competition, and misappropriation claims. Id.
104. Id. at 829.
105. Williams Electronics, Inc. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870, 870 (3rd Cir. 1982).
106. Apple, 714 F.2d at 1249.




Particularly noteworthy in the case of SAS Institute was the
language of the Apple holding stating that a program is pro-
tected from unauthorized copying "whether from its object or
source code version."10 9 SAS Institute involves not the mechan-
ical duplication of object code programs as in Apple,1 0 but
rather allegations that S&H infringed the copyright of an ob-
ject code program by employing the source code provided with
the program to translate SAS for use on an incompatible
computer."'
With the copyrightability of object code software resolved in
Apple," 2 the primary copyright issue confronting the court in
SAS Institute became the factual problem of determining
whether copying, and therefore infringement, had occurred."
3
C. Distinguishing the Cases
The facts of SAS Institute may be distinguished from those of
Apple in many respects. The disputed programs in Apple con-
stituted operating systems software," 4 while SAS Institute in-
volved an applications program." 5 We have seen, however,
that Apple itself obviated the legal significance of this distinc-
tion." '6 Franklin's conduct in pirating Apple's software was
relatively effortless," 7 while S&H's conduct in writing a VAX-
compatible version of SAS required at least several weeks of
work." 8 Indeed, this distinction seems to go unnoticed in the
SAS Institute analysis, although one might well argue it should
have been a significant consideration." 9
108. Congress could, of course, again amend the Copyright Act, or create a separate
preemptive body of law directed at computer software. See, e.g., Comment, Softright:
A Legislative Solution to the Problem of Users' and Producers' Rights in Computer
Software, 44 LA. L. REV. 1413 (1984).
109. Apple, 714 F.2d at 1249.
110. Id. at 1245.
111. SAS Institute, 605 F. Supp. at 821.
112. Id. at 829.
113. Supra note 101 and accompanying text.
114. Apple, 714 F.2d at 1243-44.
115. The SAS package ran in conjunction with IBM systems software and was
therefore an applications program. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
116. Apple, 714 F.2d at 1251-52.
117. Id. at 1245.
118. SAS Institute, 605 F. Supp. at 821, 822.
119. The very fact that S&H attempted to adapt SAS rather than merely duplicate
or "pirate" it suggests that S&H invested substantial programming expertise in modi-
fying the Institute's original IBM program code. Logically, triers of fact should con-
[Vol. 9:255
COPYRIGHT PROTECTION
Apple differs from SAS Institute in two other crucial re-
spects. Most importantly, in Apple copying was undisputed,
120
while in SAS Institute its existence was the central issue before
the court. In addition, Apple involved verbatim copying;121 the
court in SAS Institute did not consider whether S&H's final
product was an exact copy 122 of SAS, but rather, it considered
whether S&H created an original product or an infringing de-
rivative work.
123
Consequently, the Apple decision left unresolved two crucial
issues facing the court in SAS Institute, issues which may
plague trial courts in Apple's wake. First, while object code is
now a proper subject of copyright law, how is a court to com-
pare works expressed in this nearly imperceptible binary lan-
guage of object code? Second, in cases of non-verbatim copying,
what degree of similarity should a court regard as "substantial"
in determining infringement of computer programs?
IV
Determining Copying
It is a rare case where a copyright owner can use direct evi-
dence to prove that the defendant duplicated all or part of his
work.124 Usually, copying must be shown circumstantially.1
25
Courts will infer copying where the copyright owner can show:
(1) the alleged infringer's access to the copyrighted work; and
(2) a "substantial similarity" between the two works. 26
The substantial similarity test requires the trier of fact to lay
the two works side by side and compare them in an effort to
determine whether, in the judgment of a lay person, the second
sider the amount of effort that went into a work in determining whether it was an
original or a derivative work. This issue is discussed at length in section IV.
120. Apple, 714 F.2d at 1245.
121. Id.
122. SAS Institute, 605 F. Supp. at 828.
123. Id.
124. Direct evidence of copying might consist of a witness' testimony that he ob-
served the defendant load the copyrighted program into a computer and, after a few
simple keystrokes, the defendant removed a disk later used to execute the copy-
righted program. "Because pirates are unlikely to be obvious about their copying,
proof of the direct use of the copyrighted work in preparing a copy is virtually impos-
sible." Note, supra note 3, at 1276.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1278-79; Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp.,
562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977).
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appears to be all or in part a copy of the first. 27 While this task
is ordinarily simple in the case of a prose work, the process of
comparing two computer programs expressed in object code is
inherently problematic.'28 Object code is not perceivable to the
naked eye as the test contemplates, but is decipherable only by
properly trained programmers aided by machines. 29 The first
hurdle courts must overcome in applying the substantial simi-
larity test after Apple, then, is learning to "read" object code.
Apple did not address this obstacle because Franklin did not
dispute copying. 3 ° In SAS Institute, defendant S&H conceded
only that it licensed the copyrighted object code SAS program,
examined the source code and documentation provided with
the program,' and executed comparison test runs of SAS in
preparing the VAX program it called INDAS.1 2 S&H argued
adamantly that the final object code INDAS program was so
dissimilar to SAS as to be an original work of authorship.'
33
Rather than confront the comparison problem directly, the
court in SAS Institute skirted the central factual issue raised
by S&H-the question of similarity.3 At the Institute's urg-
ing, the court adopted an analysis focusing on: (1) a compari-
son between the SAS source code and the source code from
INDAS in its "earliest stages of development," rather than the
final published version;35 (2) the conduct of S&H's program-
mers and other agents; 36 and (3) the basic similarities of struc-
ture and function between INDAS and SAS.
137
As a framework for infringement analysis in the computer
127. Note, supra note 3, at 1265.
128. "[Determining whether defendant appropriated plaintiff's expressions] is par-
ticularly difficult in the case of complex computer software. ... '[O]ne is always free
to make the machine do the same thing as it would if it had the copyrighted work
placed in it, but only by one's own creative effort rather than by Piracy.'" SAS Insti-
tute, 605 F. Supp. at 829 (citing CONTU Report, supra note 8).
129. Supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
130. Apple, 714 F.2d at 1245.
131. SAS Institute, 605 F. Supp. at 820-22.
132. Id. at 821.
133. Id. at 829.
134. The court devoted considerable attention to S&H's actions in licensing SAS,
loading SAS source code, and other activities which demonstrate S&H's access to the
contents of the copyrighted program. Of the 65 paragraphs labeled "Findings of Fact"
at the beginning of the court's memorandum opinion, none mention direct object code
comparisons between SAS and INDAS. See id. at 818-26.
135. Id. at 822.
136. Id. at 830.
137. Id. at 829-30.
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software context, the SAS Institute court's approach has severe
drawbacks.138 At best it pays only lip service to traditional
infringement analysis. At worst, it raises serious issues as to
the fair use of existing technology, the relevancy of "bad faith"
and related notions in copyright actions, and the extension of
copyright law to include concepts and ideas in addition to
expressions.
A. Confusing the Issues
Because it granted the plaintiff relief in SAS Institute based
on copyright and contract theories, the court ostensibly re-
fused to address the issues of fraud, unfair competition, and
trade secret misappropriation. 139 Why, then, did the court
devote so little analysis to similarities between the final ver-
sions of SAS and INDAS, 40 and so much attention to what
might be termed evidence of S&H's contractual "bad faith" in
lying about its purpose in licensing SAS, 4' in billing the pro-
ject to its computer account under the heading "SAS,"' 42 and
in contacting a representative of VAX manufacturer Digital
Equipment Company about marketing INDAS?
4 3
It appears that by focusing on the defendant's conduct
through a complex series of events, the court lost sight of the
relevant issues in the forest of immaterial disputes. By empha-
sizing the defendant's conceded access to SAS source code,4
the court neglected the plaintiff's duty to show actual similar-
ity between the copyrighted and allegedly infringing works. 45
SAS Institute seems to be a typical case of the court having
"stated that [it was] applying the test and then ignor[ing] its
standards.'
' 46
138. For a view approving the SAS Institute court's method, compare Conley &
Bryan, supra note 11. One of the article's authors, Professor John M. Conley, liti-
gated SAS Institute on behalf of the Institute. Id. at 582 n.158.
139. SAS Institute, 605 F. Supp. at 817-18.
140. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
141. SAS Institute, 605 F. Supp. at 820.
142. Id. at 822.
143. Id. at 820-21.
144. This emphasis resulted in part from the fact that the same evidence which
proves S&H's access to SAS source code (in loading and editing it) also proves S&H's
misuse of SAS. This misuse was indeed relevant to the Institute's contract claim. The
presence of the contract action, then, seems to have drawn the court further off
target.
145. See supra note 134.
146. Note, supra note 3, at 1265.
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The evidence examined by the court pointing to actual simi-
larity between INDAS and SAS was received in the form of
expert testimony. The SAS Institute court appointed its own
expert. 147 His role, however, was that of intermediary between
the court and the programmers, testifying for each of the
parties.148 Under this approach, the question of determining
copying (to the extent the court applied the two-pronged cir-
cumstantial test) turned on the respective credibility of the
SAS Institute and S&H programmers. At one crucial factual
juncture, these experts' opinions were in conflict with regard to
the degree of similarity between SAS and S&H source code.
While both men were certainly "interested parties," the court
simply held that S&H's programmer lacked credibility and en-
tirely disregarded his conclusions:
One of the Institute's experts, Dr. Peterson, testified that it
was his expert opinion that early source code for the S&H
product was substantially similar to the source code for SAS.
The Court finds his testimony credible, and accepts it....
Although [S&H expert] Dr. Merten [concluded that these ex-
amples] were not evidence of copying, this conclusion is enti-
tled to little or no weight. Dr. Merten testified that it was
based on his evaluation of the credibility of S&H programmers
with whom he discussed the matter, and his decision to believe
their statements. This Court by contrast has found testimony
presented by S&H programmers to be not credible.
149
The court's decision as to credibility could not help but be
colored by its focus on S&H's conduct, which included inculpat-
ing evidence unnecessary to prove the copyright claim.
B. Fair Use of Existing Technology
Like all technologists, computer programmers rely on tech-
niques learned from past works to develop new ones. No one
expects the programmer to reinvent the wheel each time he
authors a program. The programmer need not avoid using
every concept, step, or coding method ever employed before his
147. SAS Institute, 605 F. Supp. at 818.
148. "The Court requested proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law from
the parties, and has adopted many of those submitted, verbatim, as the findings of fact
and conclusions of law of the Court." Id.
The court-appointed expert "attended the pretrial hearings, conferences, and trial.
Prior to trial, the experts for the two sides submitted written reports to him." Conley
& Bryan, supra note 11, at 586 n.191.
149. SAS Institute, 605 F. Supp. at 822.
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work can be called original. For purposes of copyright analysis,
the factual issue should be whether he has crossed the line
from legitimate use of techniques existing within the public do-
main to piracy.
15 0
The question is necessarily one of degree.' 5' Copyright law
attempts to strike the balance between the protection of works
and the free dissemination of ideas that will lead to a max-
imization of creative effort.'52 Some proprietary protection is
necessary to produce an economic incentive to create new
works. 53 However, if the scale is tipped too far toward protect-
ing underlying ideas as well as expressions, fear of prosecution
for copyright infringement will stifle authorship.
By comparing SAS source code with INDAS source code at
its earliest stages of development, 5 1 the court completely ig-
nores the defense raised by S&H. Since S&H admits using SAS
code as a source when it began designing its program,'155 it is
likely that at the very earliest stage INDAS source code was
not only similar to SAS code but identical. The court's ap-
proach does not address S&H's contention that prior to releas-
ing INDAS, its programmers so modified this early source code
in order to overhaul it and effectively create a new program.
56
C. Ideas versus Expressions
Having established S&H programmers' access to SAS source
code, and conceding that S&H designed INDAS after reflecting
to one degree or another on techniques used in the Institute's
program,'57 "the critical issue is whether S&H appropriated
from SAS only ideas and concepts, or whether it also appropri-
ated expression."' S&H admitted at trial that it adopted the
SAS organizational scheme, but contended it wrote the actual
program code for each of the many steps involved in statistical
150. See infra note 158 and accompanying text.
151. Note, supra note 3, at 1274.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 1275.
154. SAS Institute, 605 F. Supp. at 822.
155. Admittedly, S&H violated a licensing agreement as well as a copyright in orig-
inally duplicating the SAS source code in its VAX computers, but the court fails to
separate this violation from the infringement action concerning the final works.
156. SAS Institute, 605 F. Supp. at 831.
157. In other words, let us assume plaintiff had proved defendant's use of some
SAS technology.
158. SAS Institute, 605 F. Supp. at 829.
1987]
COMM/ENT L. J.
analysis independently of the actual SAS code.159 In holding
that INDAS constituted a derivative work of the copyrighted
program,160 the court relied on Meredith Corporation v. Harper
& Row Publishers, Inc.,161 in which the court held that in out-
lining a copyrighted textbook and then writing "original" text
based on the outlines, defendant's employees duplicated ex-
pression and not merely ideas. 62
The Meredith approach is misguided in the context of com-
puter software. It ignores a fundamental difference between
software and most other technical literary works: "the pro-
gram itself both expresses the innovation and performs the
new operation.' 1 63 As the SAS Institute court notes, the
programmer is free to make the machine behave as it would
with the copyrighted program in it.' 64 Because a computer pro-
gram instructs a machine to perform work by designating a
specific sequence of basic steps, the overall order of these steps
is to some degree preordained by the function of the program.
SAS being a statistical analysis program, the basic structure
underlying it is largely preordained by mathematical formulae
which are not even patentable. In extending the Institute's
copyright to protect the outline structure of SAS, then, the
court has provided the plaintiff with an unfounded monopoly
over an underlying idea.
The court in reaching its holding also points to specific simi-
larities between SAS and INDAS source code. A plaintiff's ex-
pert identified forty-four lines out of the 186,000 total lines of
INDAS source code which appeared to have been copied from
SAS. 65 The court found this similarity consequential. 6
This finding ignores the technical reality that in computer
programming certain steps, called commands, recur with great
frequency, whatever the nature of the program examined.
167
Inevitably, in a program as lengthy as SAS or INDAS, certain
159. Id. at 826.
160. Id. at 831. The court called S&H's conduct "analogous to stealing the
blueprints for a skyscraper." Id. at 826.
161. 378 F. Supp. 686 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd 500 F.2d 1221 (2d Cir. 1974), opinion after
trial, 413 F. Supp. 385 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
162. SAS Institute, 605 F. Supp. at 826.
163. Note, supra note 3, at 1292.
164. SAS Institute, 605 F. Supp. at 829 (citing CONTU Report, supra note 8).
165. Id. at 822.
166. Id.
167. These commands constitute the very lexicon of computer programming and
are not the work or property of any one programmer.
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basic steps will appear at least forty-four times even in the com-
plete absence of copying."8 Testimony that forty-four lines of
INDAS were identical to forty-four lines of SAS, then, does not
necessarily evidence copying.
Given the finite number of commands available in communi-
cating with a computer, in determining whether step recur-
rence evidences copying, courts must evaluate program code at
three levels. The fact finder must first identify the quantitative
significance of code similarities, as the court did in SAS Insti-
tute. To determine whether this quantitative similarity re-
flects the likelihood of copying or merely the inevitable
recurrence of basic steps, the court must further evaluate al-
leged copying for its technical significance. Finally, the court
must determine whether any similarities are of legal signifi-
cance. Because courts are ill-equipped to compare computer
code, much less determine its technical significance, courts
"may have to delegate to the experts not only observing the
works and identifying similarities, but also the ultimate deter-
mination of whether such similarities are substantial. 169
V
Conclusion
While the decision to afford copyright protection to computer
programs embedded on ROM chips generated substantial de-
bate among legal scholars, its impact has since been tempered
by legislation directed specifically toward protecting certain in-
tellectual property aspects of microchips.170 That an otherwise
copyrightable program should not be denied protection simply
because it constitutes part of the computer's operating system
seems sensible in light of the objectives of copyright law. But
168. In BASIC language programming, for example, one might expect the com-
mand "print" to appear in every other line. This concept holds still truer the lower
the level of language involved. At the object code level, a computer typically requires
several commands simply to add the numbers one and one; and several more to print
the correct answer. As the levels descend in sophistication from BASIC to object code
then, each step becomes more minute and therefore more likely to recur.
169. Conley & Bryan, supra note 11, at 586 n.192.
170. The Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984, 17 U.S.C. § 901-14 (Supp. III
1985), grants exclusive rights similar to those afforded under copyright law expressly
to designers of semiconductor chips. The Act provides penalties for the unauthorized
duplication of chip circuitry or the unauthorized making of mask works (blueprints of
chip circuitry from which identical chips can be easily and inexpensively manufac-
tured). However, the Act does not directly address the nature of the computer pro-
grams embodied on these chips.
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just as essential to the Apple court's holding-and potentially
more far-reaching for programmers and judicial fact finders
alike-is the Apple court's construction of the Copyright Act:
that computer programs, whether expressed in object or source
code, are protected literary works.
If the court's interpretation of legislative intent is correct,
and there is ample evidence to suggest that conclusion, then
Congress' refusal to draw a pragmatic distinction between eas-
ily-interpreted source code and hard-to-interpret object code
lays a trap for judicial fact finders in future cases. The Apple
holding, which appears well-reasoned under its clear facts of
undisputed copying, has opened the door to uncertainty among
judges as to how to determine when a computer program has
been copied and therefore infringed-a subject on which Apple
gave no guidance.
This uncertainty presents a potential for injustice. Left undi-
rected, courts may apply inconsistent standards of copying. Not
only might similar cases receive disparate treatment, but pro-
grammers are left straddling a thin line between the fair use of
state-of-the-art technology and infringement. Further, the
danger exists that courts, finding traditional standards for de-
termining copying difficult to apply in the case of object code
programs, will privately abandon statutory criteria. Instead,
they might adopt SAS Institute's approach and focus on the de-
fendant's persistent efforts to gain unauthorized access to intel-
lectual property, while ignoring the dissimilarities of the
resulting product.
A. Is Apple Sound Law?
The holding in Apple was not directed toward nor necessi-
tated by situations such as those in SAS Institute. Rather, Ap-
ple was intended to deter the verbatim piracy of mass-
marketed microcomputer programs. Copyright remains the
only effective avenue for protecting this type of software. Pat-
ent protection is available only for inventions which meet cri-
teria for novelty and non-obviousness; an invention fails to
meet these criteria if it has been invented or used by others, or
if its workings have been described in a publication available in
the United States.17' Most microcomputer programs merely
apply existing technology in a new manner to solve particular
171. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1984).
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problems and would face difficulty satisfying the novelty re-
quirement for patent law protection.172 The length of time re-
quired to obtain a patent makes it an impractical avenue for
protecting proprietary interests in the fast-paced computer in-
dustry.1 73 Trade secret protection requires confidentiality in
every dealing and is therefore unavailable in the mass-market-
ing context.1 74 Similarly, unilateral adhesion contracts also pro-
vide only weak protection to mass-market software sellers.175
Further, the Apple decision is supported by the extensive leg-
islative history surrounding the 1976 and 1980 revisions of the
Copyright Act, most notably CONTU's Final Report. 76 For
these reasons, copyright protection of object code computer
software remains good and necessary law.
By accommodating new fact-finding procedures and encour-
aging SAS-type plaintiffs to exercise non-copyright avenues of
intellectual property law, courts and Congress can preserve the
integrity of the traditional substantial similarity analysis while
still affording vital copyright protection to mass-marketed
software.
B. Legislative Action to Encourage Alternative Protection of
Object Code Software
Justice might have been better served had the Institute re-
lied on non-copyright theories to obtain its desired relief. The
Institute clearly prevailed in its breach of contract action
against S&H. From a factual standpoint, the Institute's strong-
est case was in showing that S&H had misused SAS software
under the terms of the licensing agreement. 77 Furthermore,
since this license imposed privity and a covenant of confidenti-
ality on the parties, a common obstacle to using trade secret
law-confidentiality-could have been surmounted in SAS In-
stitute. 78 Trade secret law protects not only particular expres-




176. For a criticism of CONTU's conclusions as applied to object code programs,
see Samuelson, CONTU Revisited. The Case Against Copyright Protection for Com-
puter Programs in Machine-Readable Form, 1984 DUKE L.J. 663.
177. As noted supra text accompanying note 99, the SAS licensing agreement pro-
hibited S&H from making any copies whatever of the SAS program. S&H concededly
violated this provision when its programmers loaded SAS source code into their VAX
computer, thereby making a copy of that code.
178. Supra note 174.
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sions, but proprietary ideas themselves. It applies to matter
which is kept confidential and which is not readily perceivable
from the item embodying it.
179
In cases such as SAS Institute which involve expensive,
state-of-the-art, individually distributed packages, and where
non-verbatim copying is alleged, judicial reliance on contract
and trade secret misappropriation doctrines would simplify, ex-
pedite, and ensure greater fairness in rendering verdicts.
However, many commentators have noted a potential obsta-
cle to this alternative approach.1 8 0 The Copyright Act contains
a preemption clause. Under present law it is questionable
whether a programmer can copyright software to protect ver-
batim expression and later pursue a trade secret action;' 8 ' an
infringement action may be the exclusive remedy for works en-
compassed by the Act which, after Apple, includes virtually all
computer programs. In SAS Institute, the court dismissed the
plaintiff's trade secret claims, having already granted relief for
copyright infringement. Congress should amend the preemp-
tion clause to provide that the availability of copyright protec-
tion does not preclude plaintiffs such as SAS Institute from
pursuing trade secret theories in non-verbatim copyright
instances.
C. Special Masters
Neither Congress nor Apple dictated the SAS Institute
court's misguided approach to determining copying in the com-
puter code context. It is difficult but not impossible to read
and therefore to compare works expressed in object code.
Properly trained programmers aided by computers can make
these comparisons. The SAS Institute court was misguided not
in that it employed expert testimony, but in that it relied heav-
ily on the highly conclusory testimony of two interested par-
ties, despite appointing its own expert.
By appointing Special Masters educated in both computer
technology and the basics of the applicable law, courts using
expert testimony could retain the substantial similarity test,
and yet avoid the two primary problems illustrated by SAS In-
179. Note, supra note 3, at 1269 n.32.
180. See, e.g., Note, The Copyrightability of Computer Software Containing Trade




stitute's reliance on party experts.8 2 The availability of an im-
partial Master in addition to the parties' witnesses would free
the court from influence by swearing contests like those found
in SAS Institute. Properly trained in the application of the sub-
stantiality standard, a Master could submit intelligent findings
as to the technological and legal significance of instances of al-
leged copying. Courts in non-jury trials could then adopt these
findings. In jury trials, the Master's conclusions would be sub-
mitted to jurors as recommendations.
8 3
D. A Final Suggestion
Nowhere does Apple state an intention to abolish the proper
role of courts as fact-finders or shift the burden of demonstrat-
ing copying from the copyright owner. Instead, Apple chal-
lenges Congress and courts to develop workable standards for
determining copying in the context of object code works. Con-
gress should amend the Copyright Act again, providing an al-
ternative to reliance on copyright law in difficult cases. Courts
too should stop skirting the Apple challenge, and begin devel-
oping new practices to accommodate the decision by directly
confronting the problem of determining copying.
182. Masters are frequently used as fact-finders in other technically difficult areas
of law, including bankruptcy, antitrust, and tax law.
183. SAS Institute, 605 F. Supp. at 817-18.
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